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PLAYING NICE WITH PATENTS: DO VOLUNTARY NON-




As part of a growing phenomenon, patent holders are 
increasingly making voluntary, public commitments to limit their 
patent’s enforcement and other exploitation. While most of these 
commitments are FRAND commitments, in which patent holders 
promise to license their patents to manufacturers of standardized 
products on terms that are “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory,” a growing number of voluntary patent pledges 
are made outside the scope of standard-setting organizations or 
contexts. All of these voluntary public pledges seek to provide 
some degree of assurance that users of the pledged patents will not 
face patent litigation suits. However, the exact degree of assurance 
depends on the legal theory applied to patent pledges. The 
following article offers an overview of legal considerations for 
voluntary patent pledges, which go beyond FRAND commitments. 
These voluntary patent pledges have neither been tested in court 
nor examined in great detail yet. The goal of this article is to 
provide an overview of legal arguments based on United States 
and German law for those who are considering the use and 
reliance on of voluntary patent pledges. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Growing commercial competition between technology 
companies has created a new focus on obtaining and enforcing 
patent portfolios. In the majority of cases, patents are still used in 
the “traditional” way by prohibiting competitors from using the 
technology; commercially licensing patents against often costly 
fees; or as a part of defensive portfolios that are only used in case 
of a patent assertion by competitors. However, in recent years 
more and more patent holders are applying alternative strategies. 
Above all, patent holders are making public promises to refrain 
from asserting patents against open source code or other 
technologies, to refrain from seeking remedies such as injunctive 
relief, or to abstain from transferring patents to non-practicing 
entities.1 These voluntary public promises constantly grow in 
popularity, especially in large and heavily litigated sectors of the 
global technology marketplace, and are often referred to as “patent 
pledges.”2 With the rise of these alternative uses of patents, the 
questions that must be asked are how to qualify and how to enforce 
voluntary patent pledges in an international context. 
A. Voluntary Patent Pledges (VPPs) 
Voluntary patent pledges (“VPPs”) are characterized as public 
announcements, which can be made in a variety of different 
settings and formats including website postings, press releases, or 
even public speeches.3 As such, they are intended to address the 
public rather than one or more specific addressees. 
Individuals and companies who take advantage of these 
pledges by using and investing in the covered patents rely on the 
pledges being binding and enforceable. However, legal 
qualification of voluntary patent pledges is ambiguous and almost 
unpredictable. To date, none of the currently known patent pledges 
                                                
 1 See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments 
and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479, 479 (2015). 
 2 For a comprehensive overview of patent pledges, see generally Jorge 
Contreras, Non-SDO Patent Statements & Commitments, PROGRAM ON 
INFORMATION JUSTICE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (June 11, 2015), 
http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/. 
 3 See id. 
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have been tested in court. While some commentators have looked 
into Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (“FRAND”) 
commitments, which are made within the context of Standards 
Development Organizations (“SDOs”),4 much less legal analysis is 
available with regards to voluntary patent pledges. 
This Article aims to provide further thoughts on pressing legal 
questions with a special focus on voluntary patent pledges. While 
litigants and courts have often described FRAND commitments as 
contractual,5 it remains questionable whether VPPs can be 
qualified as contracts and what alternative legal theories can be 
applied, such as the general principles of promissory estoppel.6 
Depending on the legal theory applied to patent pledges, 
significantly different legal consequences will arise. Thus, careful 
drafting and deliberate legal language is required to accurately 
reflect the intention of the respective pledgor and to also respect 
the interests and expectations of the pledge recipient. 
B. Different Types of VPPs 
As a general distinction, two different types of VPPs are 
currently dominating the market: generic and almost standardized 
VPPs, which are signed by various different companies, and 
individually drafted VPPs, which are used by specific companies.7 
The difference is of interest since it shows the variety of VPPs 
currently in use. 
1. General or Standard VPPs 
One prominent example of a voluntary patent pledge used by 
several different companies is “The Patent Pledge,” which 
promises “no first use of software patents against companies with 
less than 25 people.”8 A total of thirty-three different companies 
have signed the pledge, mostly coming from the start-up scene.9 
                                                
 4 Contreras, supra note 1, at 480. 
 5 Id. at 481–82. 
 6 See infra Part III.A.1. 
 7 For examples of modern non-SDO VPPs, see Contreras, supra note 2. 
 8 THE PATENT PLEDGE, http://www.thepatentpledge.org (last visited Jan. 24, 
2016). 
 9 Id. 
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Similarly, the Eco-Patent Commons project requires participating 
companies to: 
irrevocably . . . pledge and covenant . . . that we will not assert any of 
our listed patents (including any worldwide counterparts) against you 
for any infringing machine, manufacture, process, or composition of 
matter claimed in such listed patent(s) where such infringing item alone 
(or when included in a product or service) reduces/eliminates natural 
resource consumption, reduces/eliminates waste generation or 
pollution, or otherwise provides environmental benefit(s).10 
Current members of the Eco-Patent Commons include 
prominent names, such as Bosch, IBM, Nokia, and Sony.11 Finally, 
and as further examples of generic VPPs, the Open Web 
Foundation Contributor License Agreement and Open Web 
Foundation Agreement both use a standardized language to 
promise not to assert patent rights,12 and the Standardized 
Contributor Agreements available at contributoragreements.org 
offer a patent pledge option as an alternative to the traditional 
patent license commonly used in contributor agreements. While 
“The Patent Pledge” is explicitly drafted as “not legally binding,”13 
the Eco-Patent Commons pledge, the Open Web Foundation’s 
pledges, and the Standardized Contributor Agreements are written 
to be legally binding.14 
2. Individual VPPs 
Individual VPPs are drafted for, and used by, specific 
companies, often with a special focus on Free and Open Source 
Software (“FOSS”) development and use. A well-known example 
                                                
 10 ECO-PATENT COMMONS, Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or Submitting 
Additional Patents to the Commons 3, http://ecopatentcommons.org/sites/ 
default/files/docs/ecopatentgroundrules.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 11 Members, ECO-PATENT COMMONS, http://ecopatentcommons.org/members 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 12 The OWF 1.0 Agreements – Granted Claims, OPEN WEB FOUNDATION, 
http://www.openwebfoundation.org/legal/the-owf-1-0-agreements (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2016). 
 13 Paul Graham, The Patent Pledge, PAULGRAHAM.COM (August 2011), 
http://paulgraham.com/patentpledge.html. 
 14 See, e.g., The OWF 1.0 Agreements – Granted Claims, OPEN WEB 
FOUNDATION, http://www.openwebfoundation.org/legal/the-owf-1-0-agreements 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (“[T]his promise is intended to be binding.”). 
488 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 17: 483 
is Google’s “Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge,” which was 
launched in 201315 and covers a list of specifically identified and 
pledged patents published on Google’s website.16 However, 
Google was not the first company to make such a voluntary public 
commitment. IBM already committed not to assert any of the 500 
patents made available on their website in 2005;17 Twitter 
introduced the “Innovator’s Patent Agreement” in 201218 and Red 
Hat made a public promise to refrain from enforcing an infringed 
patent they held if that patent is exercised by any third party with 
respect to Free and Open Source Software.19 Most recently, a great 
deal of attention was paid to Tesla’s announcement that “[a]ll our 
patents belong to you.”20 
Since all of these voluntary patent pledges were originally 
designed and drafted to accommodate a specific situation and a 
specific company’s need, the language and exact wording of each 
pledge differ significantly, which makes a general assessment of 
patent pledges nearly impossible.21 However, a few commonalities 
and comparable legal aspects can be found, based on which 
                                                
 15 Google’s Promise Not To Assert 10 Patents Against Open Source Software: 
Just A PR Stunt, FOSS PATENTS (March 28, 2013), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/03/googles-promise-not-to-assert-10.html. 
 16 Pledged Patents, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/patents/ 
opnpledge/patents/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 17 See IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf (last visited Jan. 
24, 2016); see also Legally Binding Commitment Not to Assert Nokia Patents 
against the Linux Kernel, NOKIA, http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20051229190243/http://www.nokia.com/iprstatements (last visited Jan. 24, 
2016) (stating Nokia’s commitment not to assert Nokia patents against the Linux 
Kernel) (archived from original source). 
 18 Adam Messinger, Introducing the Innovator’s Patent Agreement, TWITTER 
(April 17, 2012), https://blog.twitter.com/2012/introducing-innovators-patent-
agreement. 
 19 Statement of Position and Our Promise on Software Patents, RED HAT, 
http://www.redhat.com/legal/patent_policy.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 20 Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA MOTORS (June 12, 
2014), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you. 
 21 However, most of these patent pledges are licensed under a Creative 
Commons license and can therefore be shared and used by everyone interested. 
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different drafting opportunities can help to address different 
motivations and strategic goals. 
C. Interests and Motivations 
Despite initial concerns and doubts, FOSS has gained ground 
and become one of the most successful developments over the past 
years. The core idea of FOSS is to make software available, with 
source code, to everyone.22 A broad range of user’s rights are 
licensed free of charge and all users benefit from further 
developments made precisely because these changes themselves 
are in turn made available free of charge.23 In addition to the well-
known role of intellectual property rights in stimulating 
investments, a variety of other factors play an increasingly 
important role in software innovation, including using many eyes 
to reduce and quickly address bugs, cost sharing synergies, or ease 
of customization. Based on this strategy, the software sector is 
enjoying enormous growth in free and open source based 
innovation. Not only are most patent pledges available today made 
in the context of software development, but there is also a 
“philosophical” link between the increasing phenomenon of patent 
pledges and the success of Free and Open Source Software 
licenses. Pledgor and licensor are not focusing on immediate 
commercial return for their inventions or creations; rather, they 
encourage a broad availability of common technology platforms in 
order to enable long term and market-wide cost savings and 
efficiencies.24 This becomes especially clear when looking at 
Tesla’s promise not to enforce any patents.25 Criticized by some as 
                                                
 22 See TILL JAEGER & AXEL METZGER, OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 1–2 (3d ed., 
Beck CH 2011).  
 23 Till Jaeger & Axel Metzger, Open Source Software and German Copyright 
Law, 33 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 52, 55 (2001). 
23 Till Jaeger & Axel Metzger, Open Source Software and German Copyright 
Law, 33 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 52, 55 (2001). 
 24 Dirk Riehle, The Economic Case for Open Source Foundations, 
COMPUTER, Jan. 2010, 93, 93. 
 25 Musk, supra note 20. 
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a marketing tool, Tesla’s pledge may indeed lead to robust new 
markets for battery technology.26 
1. Benefits to the Patent Holder 
One of the rationales behind patent pledges is the incentive for 
other market participants to make investments in the covered 
technology platform. Possible investments include contractual 
commitments, purchase of durable goods and capital equipment, 
employee training, development or procurement of information 
technology, identifying and contracting suppliers, and building 
customer relationships.27 Because most of these investments make 
it more difficult to switch to an alternative technology later on, 
they can easily lead to a lock-in effect for market participants and 
give patent holders a much better position in subsequent license 
negotiations.28 
On a more general level, patent pledges are intended to create 
network effects. Since they are designed to provide assurance to 
the market rather than to specific firms, they give certainty and 
confidence that the pledgor’s patent will not be used to block the 
adoption of a standard or other common technology platform. This 
in turn can encourage additional companies to rely on these 
platforms and focus on interoperability standards, which enable 
further development of different products and services built upon 
                                                
 26 See Phil McKenna, Why Tesla Wants to Sell a Battery for Your Home, MIT 
TECH. REV. (May 1, 2015), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/537056/ 
why-tesla-wants-to-sell-a-battery-for-your-home/. As Professor Adam Mossoff 
has pointed out, “Tesla’s new policy is an example of Musk exercising patent 
rights, not abandoning them.” Adam Mossoff, Teslas’s New Patent Policy: Long 
Live the Patent System!, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2014/08/13/teslass-new-patent-policy-long-live-the 
-patent-system/. Similarly, Professor Mark Lemley told VentureBeat, “Tesla 
recognizes that it is trying to build a network, and if it can get more people to 
invest in electric car technology, it will benefit even as others benefit too.” Eric 
Blattberg, Here’s What Tesla’s ‘Good Faith’ Patent Stance Actually Means, 
VENTUREBEAT (June, 14, 2014, 9:57 AM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2014/06/14/heres-what-teslas-good-faith-patent-stance-
actually-means/. 
 27 Contreras, supra note 1, at 6. 
 28 See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 616 (2007). 
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these standards.29 Such network effects are especially promising 
since pledged patents are still valuable for patent holders. Instead 
of transferring patents, ownership of the patents remains with the 
pledgor, but subjects them to a promise governing how the patent 
holder will or will not enforce the patents in the future. Most patent 
pledges include a termination clause with respect to any user of the 
pledged patents who aggressively files legal proceedings for patent 
infringement against the patent owner or holder.30 
Finally, VPPs may be used as a marketing tool to reflect the 
innovation potential of a company. Patents are not only used to 
exclude competitors from the use of a certain technology, they are 
also used as a means of communication to potential investors and 
other market actors. From this perspective, a patent pledge may be 
used to amplify the “signaling effects”31 of a strong patent 
portfolio. Today, many patents are stacked in defensive patent 
portfolios and are enforced only in the case of a legal action being 
brought by a competitor.32 Using a VPP favoring FOSS projects 
                                                
 29 Public benefits of technical standards have been recognized widely by 
different commentators and explained in a report by the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) as “one of the engines of modern economy.” U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N , Antitrust Enforcement And Intellectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation And Competition 33 (2007), 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompet
itionrpt0704.pdf. 
 30 Google’s language contains the right to “terminate the Pledge, to the extent 
Google deems necessary to protect itself, its affiliates, or its products and services 
(“Defensive Termination”) with respect to any Pledge Recipient (or affiliate) who 
files a lawsuit or other legal proceeding for patent infringement or who has a 
direct financial interest in such lawsuit or other legal proceeding (an “Asserting 
Party”) against Google or any entity controlled by Google or against any third 
party based in whole or in part on any product or service developed by or on 
behalf of Google or any entity controlled by Google.” GOOGLE, Open Patent 
Non-Assertion Pledge, https://www.google.com/patents/opnpledge/pledge/ (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
 31 See Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHIC. L. REV. 625, 656 (2002). 
 32 See Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The 
Defensive Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction 
Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2012). 
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does not reduce the defensive vigor of a patent portfolio, but 
maximizes the signaling effect.33 
2. Benefits to the Addressee / Pledge Recipient 
Individuals and companies who take advantage of the pledged 
patents do so to further innovate and develop their own products. 
Increased access to technology enables them to constantly keep 
pace with demand in the market and strengthen customer 
relationships. The benefits to the addressee of pledges are self-
evident: they can use technology provided by the patent holder 
without having to pay license fees. 
3. Benefits to Society at Large 
Technical standards make products less costly for firms to 
produce and more valuable to consumers.34 Likewise, patent 
pledges enable market participants to make investments in reliance 
that the eventually manufactured products and related sales will 
not be blocked by the patent holder. In turn, this encourages the 
development of improved products and services built upon access 
to technology. In this context, legal certainty and especially 
enforceability of patent pledges will help spur innovation and 
prevent social waste. In addition, patent pledges foster competition 
on the markets for products and services based on the patent 
protected technology. 
D. A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and German Law 
At first glance, voluntary patent pledges seem to be a United 
States (“U.S.”) phenomenon. However, since Germany has turned 
out to be the favorite battle ground for patent litigation in Europe,35 
the question of whether voluntary patent pledges are legally 
binding and enforceable under German law will undoubtedly 
become relevant. In addition, Germany has been a forerunner in 
                                                
 33 Empirical data of what patents are pledged by major companies is not 
available. However, one may assume that companies do not use VPPs for their 
blockbuster patents. 
 34 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N , supra note 29. 
 35 See CREMERS ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION IN EUROPE, (ZEW 2013), 
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13072.pdf. 
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enforcement of FOSS licenses.36 Consequently, it is likely that 
voluntary patent pledges announced in the context of FOSS will be 
tested in German courts. 
Another aspect that makes a comparative analysis of U.S. and 
German law with regards to patent pledges relevant is the 
difference between U.S. and German contract law.37 In particular, 
the requirements to form a binding contract under German law are 
less restrictive compared to the contract doctrine in U.S. and other 
common law jurisdictions.38 In practice, this means that patent 
pledges that do not qualify as binding contracts under U.S. law 
may still be considered a binding contract under German law. The 
different legal consequences may lead to unwanted results, which 
cannot always be avoided by adding a choice-of-law clause. A 
patent pledgor may only choose the applicable law with regard to 
those questions that may be characterized as contractual according 
to German and European principles of conflict of laws.39 The same 
principles apply to unilateral acts like waiver, consent or 
comparable dispositions. A choice of law clause may thus 
determine the applicable law for questions such as offer, 
acceptance and consideration, interpretation of contracts, warranty 
and liability etc., of a VPP. However, the proprietary aspects of 
license contracts or unilateral dispositions on intellectual property 
rights are subject to the principle of territoriality and covered by 
the law of the country for which protection is sought.40 Typical 
proprietary aspects are questions like ownership and transferability 
of intellectual property rights and licenses, requirements and 
consequences for exhaustion, or in rem-effects of licenses against 
                                                
 36 Judgements, INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL QUESTIONS ON FREE AND OPEN 
SOURCE SOFTWARE, http://www.ifross.org/en/v-judgements (last visited Jan. 25, 
2016). 
 37 See infra Part II.B (noting German contract law doesn’t require any kind of 
“consideration”). 
 38 Andres Guadamuz & Andrew Rens, Comparative Analysis of Copyright 
Assignment and Licence Formalities For Open Source Contributor Agreements, 
10:2 SCRIPTED 207 (2013), http://script-ed.org/?p=1065. 
 39 See Regulation 593/2008, Art. 3(12) (Rome I). 
 40 See EUROPEAN MAX PLANK GROUP, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Art. 3:301 (2013). 
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third parties.41 As a consequence, patent holders using VPPs should 
not be surprised if the enforcement of promises made in VPPs take 
place in German courts and are governed by German law. 
II. VPPS AS (PATENT LICENSE) CONTRACTS? 
Voluntary patent pledges are usually not addressed to any 
particular individual or company. Instead they are aimed at a 
specific market and intended to encourage market participants to 
invest in the covered technology.42 However, depending on the 
exact language and interpretation of the respective wording, 
voluntary patent pledges can be described as contractual. 
A. United States Approach 
1. Common Law Contract Doctrine 
Common law contract doctrine requires different elements for 
contracts to be enforceable, such as consideration, offer, 
acceptance, and mutual assent.43 At first glance, the interpretive 
and normative principles of contract law seem applicable to VPPs, 
particularly if the VPPs include certain conditions. The promise 
not to enforce respective patents can be interpreted as an offer not 
to enforce the patents if specified conditions are accepted, such as 
the use of the pledged patents in a particular technological context. 
By using the respective patent, the pledge recipient indicates 
agreement with the required conditions, which could qualify as 
acceptance and mutual assent.44 Since consideration can be 
anything ranging from money to physical objects, services, 
promised actions, or refraining from a future action;45 the pledgor’s 
consideration would be refraining from future enforcement and the 
user’s consideration would be compliance with the given 
conditions. Therefore, a binding contract between the pledgor and 
the user of the respective pledged patents can potentially be 
formed. 
                                                
 41 Id. 
 42 See supra Part I.B. 
 43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 44 Id. at § 50. 
 45 Id. at § 71. 
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2. Covenant-Not-To-Sue 
Whenever patent pledges can be described as a binding 
contract under U.S. law, they may qualify as a covenant-not-to-
sue. Under U.S. law, covenants-not-to-sue may be characterized as 
contracts, as suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 285(1): “A contract not to sue is a contract under which the 
obligee of a duty promises never to sue the obligor or a third 
person to enforce the duty or not to do so for a limited time.”46 In 
fact, some pledges explicitly include the term “covenant;” for 
example, the non-assert pledge signed by members of the Eco-
Patent Commons uses this phrase.47 Others use wording typical for 
covenants-not-to-sue, such as “Google will not bring a lawsuit or 
other legal proceeding against a Pledge Recipient”48 or “IBM 
hereby commits not to assert.”49 As for consideration, and because 
it is not obligatory that a sum of money is paid, it may be possible 
to create a cross covenant-not-to-sue based on any other valuable 
performance or return promise.50 
Assuming that a pledge meets the requirements of a binding 
covenant-not-to-sue, an infringement action filed by the patent 
holder will be dismissed as moot.51 Also, a declaratory judgment 
claim for non-infringement lodged by an alleged infringer may be 
dismissed; however, a court must still look at all the circumstances 
to determine whether there is a substantial controversy that 
supports a declaratory judgment action.52 Besides the procedural 
consequences, courts have accepted that covenants-not-to-sue do 
                                                
 46 Id. at § 285(1); see also Mathis v. St. Alexis Hosp. Assoc., 99 Ohio App. 3d 
159, 161, 650 N.E.2d 141, 143 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1994). 
 47 ECO-PATENT COMMONS, Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or submitting 
additional patents to the Commons, http://ecopatentcommons.org/sites/default/ 
files/docs/ecopatentgroundrules.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 48 Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
patents/opnpledge/pledge (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 49 IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM, 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf (last visited Jan. 
24, 2016). 
 50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 51 Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013). 
 52 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
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also imply a substantive authorization to use the patented 
technology similar to a non-exclusive license.53 As a consequence, 
it may be argued that products manufactured on the basis of a 
covenant-not-to-sue are subject to exhaustion and can be sold 
without prior authorization of the patent holder.54 Also, a purchaser 
of the pledged patent will be bound by all outstanding licenses.55 
Moreover, in the event of the insolvency of the patent holder, the 
covenant is not dischargeable.56 
In short, while a contractual analytical framework may be 
suitable for some VPPs, it is unsuitable for many. In practice, 
consideration remains the most crucial aspect. Qualification as a 
binding contract, and especially the type of contract—specifically 
as a covenant-not-to-sue—will depend on the exact wording of the 
respective VPP. Since most pledges have a public character and 
are intended to offer assurances to the market at large rather than to 
reflect bilateral negotiated terms between two private parties, it 
will be difficult to apply common law contract doctrine to VPPs 
and argue for a covenant-not-to-sue.57 In other words, whenever 
the covenant—in the form of a patent pledge—comes as a mere 
unilateral promise to behave in a certain way and without any 
element of exchange, it will be burdensome for the recipient of the 
pledge to plead for the conclusion of a binding covenant and for a 
binding contract in general. 
3. (Implied) Patent License 
Even if VPPs cannot be qualified as binding contracts, and 
irrespective of the discussion of whether a license is a contract or 
not under U.S. law,58 they may still be considered as licenses. In 
                                                
 53 TransCore v. Electronic Transaction Consultants, 563 F.2d 1271, 1277 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 54 Id. at 1274. 
 55 Keystone Type Foundry v. Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242, 245 (2d Cir. 1921). 
The recording requirement of § 261(2) US Patent Act is not applicable to non-
exclusive licenses, as visible from the clear wording of the provision (“exclusive 
right”). Id. 
 56 In re Spansion, Inc., 507 Fed.Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished). 
 57 Contreras, supra note 1, at 503. 
 58 See Eben Moglen, Enforcing the GNU GPL, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM 
(Sept. 10, 2001), https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/enforcing-gpl.html. The 
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1927, the Supreme Court made clear that no formal granting of a 
license is necessary in order to give it effect with their decision in 
De Forest Radio Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. United States.59 
The court stated:  
[a]ny language used by the owner of the patent or any conduct on his 
part exhibited to another, from which that other may properly infer that 
the owner consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or 
selling it, upon which the other acts, constitutes a license, and a defense 
to an action for a tort.60  
A license, according to the Court, passes no interest in the 
monopoly, but has been described as a mere waiver of the right to 
sue by the patentee.61 
A similar line of reasoning can be found in the Third Circuit’s 
2009 decision in Transcore vs. Electronic Transaction,62 which 
builds upon the principle that the grant of a patent does not provide 
the patentee with an affirmative right to practice the patent but 
merely the right to exclude.63 Consequently, according to the Third 
Circuit, a patentee, by license or otherwise, cannot convey an 
affirmative right to practice a patented invention by way of 
making, using, selling, etc., the patented invention; the patentee 
can only convey a freedom from suit.64 Even more recently, the 
Third Circuit agreed that a license is equivalent to a covenant-not-
to-sue in the bankruptcy context, arguing that the promise “to 
dismiss the action against [the defendant], and to not re-file the 
ITC action or another action related to one or more of the same 
patents against [the defendant]” was a promise “not to sue [the 
                                                                                                         
important difference is that contracts are enforced under contract law, which is 
done state by state, and there are certain necessary elements to qualify as a valid 
contract. Licenses, instead, are enforced under copyright law at the federal level. 
The penalties available are not the same. Id. 
 59 De Forest Radio Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 
236 (1927). 
 60 Id. at 241. 
 61 Id. at 242. 
 62 563 F.3d 1271 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 63 Id. at 1275 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)). 
 64 Id. 
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defendant] for its use of [the plaintiff’s] patented products” and 
therefore a “license.”65 
Assuming that future court decisions will follow the arguments 
stated by the Supreme Court in 1927 and the Third Circuit and 
consequently interpret VPPs as licenses, the exhaustion principle 
may apply to the pledged patents and any initial authorized sale of 
the patented items will terminate all patent rights to those items.66 
Furthermore, if considered a license, any pledge recipient may 
elect to retain its rights under section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Act 
as if he were a holder of an intellectual property license.67 
4. Arguments and Summary 
Even though the Supreme Court’s decision in De Forest Radio 
Telephone & Telegraph Co v. United States dates back to 1927, 
future opinions may find strong arguments for considering a VPP 
as a license, which will be difficult to ignore. Because none of the 
voluntary patent pledges described above68 have been analyzed and 
tested in courts, there is no evidence that patent pledges will be 
treated like licenses. In fact, all arguments leading to the 
interpretation as a license with all the associated legal 
consequences, have to be put in context and include the respective 
situation and—more importantly—the exact wording of the 
respective agreement in question. Even if there are strong 
arguments that courts will consider a covenant-not-to-sue and a 
license to be equivalent, there is no guarantee or legal certainty that 
voluntary patent pledges would be treated in the same way. 
Covenants-not-to-sue and licenses are drafted as bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements.69 Regardless of how many parties are involved 
in such agreements, they can always be identified at the time of 
conclusion. VPPs, in contrast, are drafted as unilateral promises. 
As such, they are not addressed to a specific individual or 
company, but to the whole market. Usually, pledging companies 
                                                
 65 In re Spansion, Inc., 507 F. App’x. 125 (3d. Cir. 2012) (unpublished). 
 66 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621, 128 S. Ct. 
2109, 2113 (2008). 
 67 See In re Spansion, Inc., 507 F. App’x 125 (3d. Cir. 2012) (unpublished). 
 68 See supra Part II.A. 
 69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 285 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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do not require anyone to register or sign anything in order to 
perfect their rights under the pledge. Consequently, they do not 
track or identify pledge recipients. Especially, where patent 
pledges are drafted deliberately short and without specified 
conditions, they are inclined to show an intention and motivation, 
which is different from the traditional way of licensing patents, 
including avoidance of all legal consequences. While this 
unilateral character may be seen as an argument to differentiate 
patent pledges from patent licenses, experience with FOSS and 
Creative Commons licenses have shown that licenses, meeting 
certain conditions, can be granted to any member of the public 
(public licenses),70 which in turn can offer an argument to support 
the view of VPPs as being on par with patent licenses and leaves 
the discussion and result open. 
B. Germany Approach 
Freedom of contract (Vertragsfreiheit) is one of the 
fundamental rights under German law. As a general principle, and 
apart from a few exceptions stated in the German Civil Code,71 
contracts can contain whatever provisions the parties agree upon.72 
Unlike the U.S. common law contract doctrine, German contract 
law does not require consideration.73 However, offer and 
acceptance are required to form a binding contract.74 
1. German Contract Law 
The offer to form a binding contract requires a declaration of 
intent (Willenserklaerung) including an intention to be bound 
                                                
 70 See Licenses, GNU OPERATING SYS., https://www.gnu.org/licenses/ 
licenses.en.html (last updated Dec. 14, 2015); About the Licenses, CREATIVE 
COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2016). 
 71 See, e.g., Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 138 (allowing 
legal transaction contrary to moral principles or exploiting the other person due 
to undue advantages) (English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html). 
 72 See id. Furthermore, they do not have to be in any particular form (e.g. in 
writing or by registration), unless specifically required by law. Id. 
 73 Id. §§ 145–51. 
 74 Id. §§ 145–47. 
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(Geschaeftswille).75 Interpretation of both must reflect the 
perspective of the addressee, so that the offer has to be interpreted 
based on “what the addressee must have understood if observed 
objectively.”76 Looking at the experience from FOSS licenses, 
which are commonly seen as license agreements between licensor 
and licensee, and therefore, as contracts under German law, patent 
pledges can be qualified as an offer to form a binding contract if 
the respective language shows a clear intention to be legally 
bound.77 Consequently, whenever a patent pledge explicitly states 
it is not to be legally binding, such as “The Patent Pledge,”78 a 
binding contract must be denied. But any patent pledge drafted to 
be legally binding may be seen as a valid offer according to 
German contract law and any use of the pledged patents may be 
seen as an acceptance. Acceptance does not necessarily have to 
reach the offeror. Instead, a contract is considered to have come 
into effect without communication of acceptance to the offeror, if 
such communication is not expected according to ordinary usage 
or if the offeror has waived such communication.79 Both 
alternatives may apply to patent pledges: the patent owner waives 
the communication requirement by relying on the public pledge, 
and it is also common practice not to notify the patent owner if the 
patent pledge is drafted as a public promise to assure the market 
rather than one individual or one particular company.80 
However, the fact that patent pledges are not written to address 
one particular company poses another question of German private 
law. Since patent pledges are formulated for an indefinite number 
of users and therefore for an indefinite number of potential 
contracts, they may be regarded as standard business terms, which 
are subject to additional restrictions as stated in Sections 305–310  
                                                
 75 Id. §§ 116–33, 145. 
 76 Id. § 157 (“Verobjektivierter Empfängerhorizont.”). 
 77 An intention to be legally bound is missing if the offeror only provides 
basic information about a specific product and thereby encourages other 
interested parties to make an offer, so called “invitatio at offerendum” (e.g. 
products shown in shop-windows). Id. 
 78 Graham, supra note 13.  
 79 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 151. 
 80 See TIM ENGELHARDT & TILL JAEGER, THE INTERNATIONAL FREE AND 
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE LAW BOOK 107 (Open Source Press 2014). 
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of the German Civil Code.81 These restrictions are supposed to 
protect parties and especially consumers when entering contracts 
that contain standard business terms.82 As a general rule, standard 
business terms can only be legally binding components of a 
contract if (1) the user of such terms either explicitly or, where 
explicit reference to standard terms is unusually difficult, in 
another reasonably noticeable manner, refers to the standard terms, 
and thereby gives the other party the opportunity to take notice of 
all details of the respective standard terms; and if (2) the other 
party agrees with these standard terms.83 In theory, these detailed 
requirements may pose a problem for the standard language of 
patent pledges to become part of a legally binding contract; 
however, in practice, it can be assumed that the user of pledged 
patents has taken note of and agreed with all details of the 
respective pledge.84 Moreover, most patent pledges are used 
between companies, while most German rules on standard business 
terms only apply in transactions with consumers.85 
In summary, voluntary patent pledges can be constructed as 
legally binding contracts under German law if the respective 
language shows clear intention to be legally bound. 
2. Interpretation of Contracts 
To understand the legal consequences, the character of the 
contract must be determined, since special contracts are governed 
by different principles under German law.86 
a. Patent License Contract 
One possible interpretation may result in a patent license 
contract. The promise not to enforce patents may be seen as the 
patent owner’s consent to use the patents. Similar to the arguments 
                                                
 81 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] §§ 305–10. 
 82 See Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 36 (EC). 
 83 See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 305. 
 84 See TILL JAEGER & AXEL METZGER, OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 164–66 (3rd 
ed., Beck CH 2011) for argumentation in the context of FOSS licenses. 
 85 See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 310(1). 
 86 See supra note 71 and accompanying text regarding taking into account 
good faith and customary practice. 
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found in U.S. case law, German scholars and courts may argue that 
patents do not give any positive, exclusive right to use the 
respective patent, but only the right to exclude others from using 
it.87 Irrespective of the theoretical and doctrinal framework of 
patent licenses in the German context, interpretation of contracts 
must identify what type of arrangement the parties wanted to 
reach. Looking at the exact wording of most of the prominent 
patent pledges, the declaration of intent constitutes the “promise 
not to bring a lawsuit for patent infringement.”88 Taken literally, 
this does not show any desire to sell or license the respective 
patent. The promise not to enforce patents—even under certain 
conditions—does not even mention any intended transfer of 
exclusive or non-exclusive rights, which would be required for a 
patent license. From the perspective of customary practice or 
“what the addressee must have understood if observed 
objectively,”89 it is also clear that neither a transfer of the patent 
nor a license can be expected. Only a specific performance can be 
anticipated, namely the performance not to enforce the pledged 
patents. 
Assuming that a patent pledge is still drafted in a way that 
suggests interpretation as a patent license contract, any 
infringement claim by the patent holder will be denied. Since a 
pledge can only be interpreted as a non-exclusive license, the 
license grant itself (disposition) will be considered non-
transferable under German law if the licensor has not explicitly 
agreed to the transfer.90 Such consent can also be given in advance 
if clearly stated in the pledge. Similar to the U.S. analysis, the 
                                                
 87 However, the theoretical question of patent licenses and the related 
dogmatic fundamentals is not quite clear in Germany. Some scholars argue 
against “negative” licenses. See Ronny Hauck, Rechtsnatur und-wirkungen eines 
covenant-not-to-sue, 5 ZGE/IPJ 206, 223 (2013) (referencing Case C-533/07, 
Falco Privatstiftung v. Weller, 2009 I-03327, GRUR 2009 at 753). Others 
explicitly refer to “negative licenses” as one possible way to structure patent 
licenses. See MAXIMILIAN HAEDICKE ET AL, PATENT LAW HANDBOOK 315 
(Beck 2014). 
 88 See, e.g., Google Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/patents/opnpledge/pledge (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 89 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] §157. 
 90 GEORG BENKARD, PATENTGESETZ 705, § 103 (C.H. Beck 2015). 
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exhaustion principle will apply to products using the respective 
pledged patents when these products have been put on the market 
within the European Union or any European Economic Area 
member state.91 
b. Covenant-Not-To-Sue 
Additional arguments may be drawn from interpreting a 
covenant-not-to-sue under German law.92 An agreement stating 
that the patent holder will not assert a patent claim against the 
other party may either be qualified as a mere procedural contract, a 
so called “pactum de non petendo,” or as a substantive contract 
which excludes the patent claim and can in turn be treated as a 
license grant. The District Court of Mannheim interpreted a 
covenant-not-to-sue in a recent case as a mere pactum de non 
petendo.93 The controversial settlement agreement combined an 
explicit, non-exclusive license for one party with a mere covenant-
not-to-sue for the other side. The court inferred from this 
difference in wording that the parties would have stipulated an 
explicit license for the other side as well if they had wanted to.94 As 
a consequence, the covenant-not-to-sue only bound the parties to 
the settlement agreement and not, after the patent was transferred, 
the transferee, who successfully enforced the patent in court.95 
Since it was not qualified as a license contract, any in rem effect 
was neglected. 
3. Arguments and Summary 
Following the analysis offered by the District Court of 
Mannheim, it is likely that German courts would qualify patent 
pledges as contracts with purely procedural effects where the 
courts can find clear indication that the parties explicitly did not 
want to enter a license agreement. However, German courts may 
also interpret patent pledges as implied patent license contracts 
                                                
 91 See HAEDICKE ET AL, supra note 87, at 804–17. 
 92 Under German law, a covenant-not-to-sue must meet the requirements of a 
contract to be binding. See Hauck, supra note 87, at 225–26. 
 93 LG Mannheim [District Court Mannheim], Apr. 23, 2010, 7 O 145/09, 
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whenever the respective wording shows clear characteristics 
comparable to a patent license, but simply avoids the term “patent 
license.” In the case of Google’s “Open Patent Non-Assertion 
Pledge,”96 the promise not to assert patent claims is embedded into 
a broader set of promises and duties, which are typical of license 
contracts. It should not only bind Google and its controlled entities 
but also their successors and persons or entities to which Google 
might transfer the pledged patents.97 The “IBM Statement of Non-
Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS”98 explicitly states: “[w]e 
are pledging the free use of 500 of our U.S. patents as well as all 
counterparts of these patents issued in other countries, in the 
development, distribution, and use of open source software.”99 This 
specific language indicates that the pledge should also imply the 
substantive right of the recipient to use the patented inventions and 
not just prevent claims on a procedural level. 
III. PATENT PLEDGES AND OTHER LEGAL THEORIES 
As analyzed above, it is uncertain whether VPPs may be 
qualified as contracts under U.S. contract law principles.100 
However, even if courts reject the application of contract law 
principles, VPPs could still have legal effects for their addressees. 
A. United States 
1. Promissory Estoppel 
It is possible to give VPPs legal effect under U.S. law even if 
they do not qualify as contracts. U.S. contract law combines a strict 
concept of contract with a more flexible and open doctrine of 
                                                
 96 Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
patents/opnpledge/pledge (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 97 “Google will require any person or entity to whom it sells or transfers any 
of the Pledged Patents to agree, in writing, to abide by the Pledge and to place a 
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 98 IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf (last visited Jan. 
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promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is 
restated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90: 
Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance: A promise which 
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce 
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only 
by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be 
limited as justice requires.101 
If one follows this approach, a mere promise which does not 
result in the conclusion of a contract may still be enforceable. 
Different from some stricter case law, the Restatement does not 
require a “clear and definite promise”102 or any other heightened 
standard of proof for the seriousness of the promise as long as the 
statement is not just a mere expression of intention to do or to 
forbear something.103 Many of the VPPs analyzed here will meet 
these requirements. Public statements like “Tesla will not initiate 
patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our 
technology”104 or “[n]o first use of software patents against 
companies with less than 25 people”105 express the promise of the 
patent holder to abstain from any patent enforcement as long as 
the–admittedly vague–conditions of the pledges are respected. For 
public announcements like “[i]t has never been, nor will it be 
Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where trace amounts 
of our patented seed or traits are present in farmer’s fields as a 
result of inadvertent means,” it is harder to predict whether a U.S. 
judge would interpret the statement as a promise in the sense of 
§ 90 or as a mere description of the future patent policy.106 
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 102 See, e.g., Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Committee v. First Jersey 
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Jorge Contreras has pointed to a second source of uncertainty 
with regard to the doctrine of promissory estoppel.107 A user of 
patented technology may only plead promissory estoppel if he has 
actually relied on the concrete patent pledge. The promise must 
have induced the user’s application of the patented technology, and 
the user bears the burden of proof for his reliance on the promise. 
What if the user was not aware of the patent or did not relate his 
product or service to the relevant patent claims? What if the user 
has purchased products that contain protected technology without 
his knowledge? Proving actual reliance may be challenging in such 
cases. It is unclear whether the first sale-doctrine will help users 
who have bought products manufactured on the basis of 
promissory estoppel. 
Furthermore, a third and very crucial source of uncertainty 
should be emphasized. The promise of the patent holder, which is 
the very basis of promissory estoppel, can be revoked at any 
moment. Such a revocation may put the user in an uncomfortable 
position when he depends on the patent holder’s willingness to 
grant a license under reasonable terms. Finally, the user’s situation 
is also uncertain if the patent is transferred. It is for good reason 
that the U.S. antitrust authorities demanded commitments by 
Apple, Google, and Microsoft that ensured the patent pledges of 
Nortel and Motorola would be upheld before investigations were 
closed.108 Without such commitments it would have been difficult 
to argue that the companies would be bound by the pledges made 
by the former right holders. 
2. Other Theories and New Approaches 
The many hurdles and uncertainties of the promissory estoppel 
approach have prompted legal scholars to develop new theories on 
how to enforce patent pledges. Jay Kesan and Carol Hayes have 
                                                
 107 Contreras, supra note 1, at 484. 
 108 Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s 
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suggested conceptualizing patent pledges, in the framework of 
FRAND commitments, according to the model of encumbrances 
on real property, which would run with the patent in the case of a 
patent transfer.109 Jorge Contreras has called for a “market reliance 
theory for patent pledges” to overcome the difficulties of proving 
actual reliance under promissory estoppel and to solve the transfer 
problem.110 These new theories are thought provoking, but have not 
yet been tested in court. 
B. Germany 
Although it is easier under German law than under U.S. 
contract law to qualify a patent pledge as a contractual 
arrangement, not all patent statements analyzed in this Article 
fulfill all the necessary criteria for a binding contract in the sense 
of sections 145 to 157 of the German Civil Code.111 However, this 
does not imply that those non-contractual pledges are without legal 
effect for other actors on the respective technology market. 
German law provides legal principles for the construction of non-
contractual, unilateral declarations on the use of intellectual 
property that may help to clarify the possible legal consequences 
for technology users relying on those pledges. 
1. Unilateral Waiver 
One possible strategy to give legal effect to a patent pledge not 
qualifying as a bilateral contract could be to interpret the statement 
as a waiver of the covered patents. A waiver is typically seen as a 
unilateral declaration that relinquishes the covered right with in 
rem effect.112 This strategy has been suggested in Germany for the 
interpretation of unilateral statements with regards to the copyright 
of a work, such as if the statement “reproduction permitted” is 
printed on sheet music.113 In the context of copyright, the German 
Federal Court has stated that copyright may not be waived entirely, 
                                                
 109 Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent 
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 294–304 (2014). 
 110 Contreras, supra note 1, at 538–57. 
 111 See supra Part II.B. 
 112 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 23, 1995, I ZR 
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because it may also not be transferred according to Section 29 of 
the German Copyright Act, but that a unilateral waiver is possible 
for single economic rights—such as the right of distribution.114 
However, such a waiver of single economic rights in favor of the 
general public is not undisputed in copyright law literature, and a 
number of authors regard it as invalid.115 In German patent law, it 
has not been tested in court whether simple patent pledges could be 
interpreted as declarations of patent waiver. Unlike copyrights, 
patents may be transferred under German and European patent 
law.116 The patent, or single patent claims,117 may also be the 
subject of a waiver.118 But such a waiver must be submitted “by 
written declaration to the Patent Office.”119 The requirements for a 
written declaration in section 126 of the German Civil Code 
demand that the document is signed by the issuer with his name in 
his own hand, or by his notarially certified initials.120 This 
requirement is not met by a simple public announcement. 
Moreover, the German Federal Court has been strict with 
interpretation of the requirement that the waiver must be declared 
“to the Patent Office.”121 In the past, the court refused to give any 
legal effect to a declaration of waiver expressed in a court 
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settlement.122 Thus, a mere public statement in electronic form 
cannot be constructed as a valid patent waiver. 
2. Simple Consent 
A VPP in a public announcement which does not constitute an 
offer for a contract may still be characterized as simple consent to 
the use of the covered technology.123 The German Federal Court 
has recently applied this approach in the prominent copyright case 
Vorschaubilder124 dealing with Google’s image search. According 
to the Federal Court, Google’s use of copyright protected material 
as thumbnails in its image search function is justified by the 
implied consent of the concerned right holders.125 The court 
inferred this implied consent from the fact that the right holders 
made images available on the Internet without technological 
measures to block the image search function. Such consent allows 
the use of covered material but does not give any enforceable right 
to the user.126 Also, the consent may be revoked prospectively at 
any time, but not with retroactive effect.127 Since the simple 
consent does not provide the user with any enforceable rights, it is 
not required that the right holder declares the intention to be 
bound.128 
The Vorschaubilder decision has been harshly criticized by 
commentators, especially for its ignorance of fundamental 
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 128 Id. at ¶ 34. 
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principles of civil law.129 One should therefore be careful and avoid 
any hasty generalization. However, the case shows the potential of 
the doctrine of consent for the “accepted use” of intellectual 
property. If companies publish announcements like the above cited 
statements of Tesla,130 such declarations may be interpreted as 
simple consent in the use of the covered technology. Such a 
characterization should even be allowed if the pledge is explicitly 
drafted as “not legally binding,”131 because it belongs to the very 
nature of a simple consent to be without any binding effect for the 
future and to be revocable at any time. Nevertheless, patent holders 
using those simple pledges should be barred from claiming 
damages for the use of their patented technology in the past. As 
long as simple consent has not been revoked, it precludes any 
claim for patent infringement that has been committed in the 
past.132 As a consequence, the principles of exhaustion should be 
applicable to products manufactured by users relying on the patent 
pledge. But the preclusion of claims comes to an end whenever the 
pledge is revoked. Users should also be careful if the patent has 
been transferred and the transferee has not announced whether the 
pledge will be upheld or revoked. The simple consent has no in 
rem effect and does not bind the transferee. Companies using 
technology on the basis of a simple patent pledge bear considerable 
economic risks. Any investment in products or services depending 
on the protected technology may be jeopardized by the patent 
holder after a revocation of the patent pledge. 
3. Good Faith as Defense 
Finally, if a public statement may neither be qualified as a 
contract offer nor as simple consent, the defendant in a patent case 
may still raise the general defense of “good faith” stated in section 
242 of the German Civil Code.133 A patent holder declaring in 
public that his patents will not be enforced but suing users of the 
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patented technology behaves inconsistently. The defendant could 
try to win the case on the basis of “venire contra factum proprium” 
doctrine, a subcategory of the broader principle of good faith. The 
“venire contra factum proprium”-doctrine has been applied by 
German courts in many different areas.134 However, the court 
practice in patent cases is meager.135 The few reported cases 
concern situations in which the patent holder declared during 
examination or opposition proceedings that he will not claim 
certain varieties of a technology but later brought claims for 
exactly those varieties against a defendant who relied on his 
declaration. The application of the “venire contra factum 
proprium”-doctrine in the case of a broken patent pledge has not 
yet been tested in German courts. The probability of succeeding 
with the defense is therefore hard to predict. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Voluntary Patent Pledges have become increasingly popular 
over the last few years. Even though VPPs are made by different 
means and with different strategic goals, they share that they are 
drafted to encourage other companies and competitors to make 
investments and to further innovate based upon the covered 
technology. In that respect, patent pledges show great potential to 
provide a new basis for innovation. However, companies and 
individuals who take advantage of these pledges to facilitate 
innovation do so in reliance on their enforceability. Thus, it is 
critical that patent pledges are legally binding and enforceable. The 
analysis provided above has shown that patent pledges can be 
interpreted in different ways and—even more importantly—that 
different national legal theories may result in different legal 
effects. 
While the U.S. analysis—especially recent U.S. case law—
suggests that patent pledges will be interpreted as patent licenses, 
with all the legal consequences of such licenses, there is also room 
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to argue that patent pledges are significantly different from 
licenses, as they are defined as unilateral promises addressed to the 
market in general and not to specifically identifiable parties. 
Promissory estoppel may offer an alternative approach to tackle 
patent pledges, but comes with additional concerns, including the 
burden of proof and revocability. The German analysis also fails to 
provide satisfactory legal certainty. Depending on the language, 
patent pledges may be interpreted as patent license contracts, mere 
procedural contracts, or simple consent with differing legal 
consequences. In addition, the defendant may use arguments based 
on good faith. Since the rule of territoriality can overrule some 
aspects of commonly implemented choice-of-law clauses, any 
future drafting of patent pledges and any use of pledged patents 
should consider the international perspective. 
Furthermore, future analysis should not only reflect commonly 
known legal instruments, but also look carefully at the parties’ will 
and the motivation behind a patent pledge. While the patent holder 
may not be willing to enter a legally binding contract or license, 
because of the known legal consequences, such as patent 
exhaustion or the first sale doctrine, he may still want competitors 
to use the technology and make investments. Pledge recipients may 
want to enjoy the benefits of immediate access to technology 
without lengthy and often costly license negotiations. Both 
perspectives have a legitimate interest and must be brought into a 
fair balance. Maximum flexibility for the pledgor will not always 
meet the requirements and prospects of the pledge recipient. 
With the current legal system not having a sensible solution or 
suitable answer, it is even more important to further discuss and 
engage in the use of patent pledges. Above all, they should not be 
used as a tool to surpass and avoid commonly accepted and proven 
legal instruments. Whenever the respective language of a patent 
pledge shows clear indications and characteristics of a license, it 
should be interpreted as such, even if packaged and labeled 
differently. In other words, pure renaming of a license cannot 
result in different legal consequences. Only in cases where the 
language of the patent pledge clearly communicates different goals 
and different envisaged legal results, and where these goals are 
understandable and foreseeable for the pledge recipient, a fair 
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balance between the interests of the respective pledgor and pledge 
recipient can be assumed. 
To conclude, voluntary patent pledges can provide a sound 
basis for innovation if they are drafted accurately and in a way that 
reflects the respective outward objective while clearly 
communicating legal consequences. With significant legal and 
economic risks for pledge recipients, it is critical to identify 
mechanisms to hold pledging companies accountable. Otherwise, 
the new patent panacea can easily backfire and hinder innovation 
instead of supporting it. Transparency and further legal analysis 
accompanied by a better informed public discussion around patent 
pledges seem inevitable to provide legal certainty for pledge 
recipients. This is especially true in order to understand the 
potential impact of unmet promises and pledges on innovation, 
competitiveness, vendor margins and ultimate costs to society. 
From a legal perspective, one way to enhance legal certainty 
could be the development of certain procedures when 
communicating patent pledges or using pledged patents. Where 
patent pledges may lead to promissory estoppel or may be 
interpreted as simple consent, clear guidelines could help to 
understand the requirements for effective revocation. A step-by-
step procedure ranging from the publication of the revocation in a 
comprehensible manner to a grace period and a final notice to the 
pledge recipient before filing infringement claims would make the 
use of pledged patents more predictable and economic risks 
calculable. Concurrently, there is room to build best practices for 
pledge recipients, such as required research of patents and related 
pledges in the field of targeted technologies or other duties to 
exercise due care and collect sufficient information before using 
pledged technology. 
From a political perspective, the growing popularity of patent 
pledges should not only pose the question of how to qualify patent 
pledges under the current legal system and provide legal certainty, 
but also the question for patent reform. Patent trolls are only one 
recent phenomenon to demonstrate that patents are used in many 
different ways and that the long known theory whereby patents 
create incentives to invent in the first place may be in need of 
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revision. After years of “patent wars” and with all the money spent 
on legal disputes, patent pledges can open the stage for a 
constructive debate about new ways for companies to make use of 
their inventions instead of blocking each other. 
 
